Charting the National Debt
Playfair first published that book in 1786, but the chart above, which comes courtesy of the Junto, takes the figures up through 1800, so it must be a reissue.
Politicians like George Grenville, and many historians since, pointed to Great Britain’s debt at the end of the Seven Years’ War as justifying the need for more revenue from the American colonies. Just how bad was that figure?
This chart shows that the national debt did rise to an unprecedented level after 1755. It had never topped £80 million since the Glorious Revolution, but in 1762 it was at £150 million. No wonder politicians in London were worried.
That debt declined by 1775, though it still wasn’t close to the pre-war level. In those years the North American Stamp Act ended up costing money, and of the several Townshend duties only the tax on tea produced significant revenue. I surmise that Britain was paying its bills because of economic growth, not new taxes.
Then the American War sent the debt soaring to almost £250 million in 1784. Another decade, and war with Revolutionary France set it off again. At the end of Playfair’s chart, Britain owed £400 million, and there were more war years to come.
Did that presage Britain’s financial default? Was the next century ruinous? Of course not. The British economy grew tremendously through industrialization, funding and being funded by a new colonial empire which extended around the globe. The country had never been more prosperous or more dominant.
As scary as the national debt looked in the early 1760s, the British state was in solid economic shape then. Nobody knew steam power was just about to change everything, but even the old system of agriculture, trade, and small manufactures was probably working well enough to maintain national prosperity.
The Crown might not have needed the revenue measures that caused all the trouble in North America. But to many statesmen watching the national debt rise much higher than it had ever been before, taxes seemed imperative.


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